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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS IN ILLINOIS: LIVING IN THE PAST,
SUFFERING IN THE PRESENT
James J. Reidy *t
The law always has been, is now, and will ever continue to be, largely
vague and variable. And how could this well be otherwise? The law deals
with human relations in their most complicated aspects. The whole con-
fused, shifting helter-skelter of life parades before it-more confused than
ever, in our kaleidoscopic age.
Even in a relatively static society, men have never been able to construct
a comprehensive, eternized set of rules anticipating all possible legal dis-
putes and settling them in advance. Even in such a social order no one can
foresee all the future permutations and combinations of events; situations
are bound to occur which were never contemplated when the original
rules were made. How much less is such a frozen legal system possible in
modern times?
Jerome Frank, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND 6 (1930).
On February 12, 1972, eight-year-old Robert Rickey, his mother, and his
younger brother entered a train station in downtown Chicago. After paying
their fares, the trio took an escalator down to a lower level to catch their
train. Robert and his mother rode the escalator without incident, but the
younger brother's dangling scarf caught in the escalator's gears and he was
dragged down by the gears' motion. Robert watched his brother, Michael,
being choked around the neck and deprived of oxygen while the escalator
continued to revolve. Before he was finally freed, Michael was comatose. As
a result of observing his brother's plight, young Robert sustained severe
mental and emotional distress and psychiatric trauma, manifested by defi-
nite functional, emotional, psychiatric and behavioral disorders. In addi-
tion, he suffered extreme depression, prolonged mental disturbances, and an
inability to attend school or engage in normal activities.
It would be reasonable to assume that Robert Rickey's attorneys, present-
ing a case based on such compelling circumstances, would encounter little
difficulty in winning a verdict for their client. The trial judge held, however,
that Robert Rickey had failed to state a cause of action and granted defend-
ant's motion to dismiss.' The court's reason for dismissing Rickey's suit was
that his injuries were not caused by direct contact with the escalator upon
which his younger brother was mangled.
* Senior Partner, James J. Reidy, Ltd.: undergraduate education, DePaul University and Iowa
State University; J.D., DePaul University. In addition to practicing personal injury law in
Illinois and other states over the past thirty years, Mr. Reidy has participated in litigation in
Canada and Mexico and has lectured before numerous medical and legal groups on diverse topics
related to his practice, including products liability, air catastrophes, and medical malpractice.
t The author wishes to express his appreciation to Illinois attorney Randall Peters; A.B., Cornell
University; J.D., DePaul University; and DePaul University law students Mark David Fisher
and Edward McCauley for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 79 L 15963 (Cook County Cir. Ct. 1980).
(Editor's Note: The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the Circuit Court and recognized the
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For nearly a century, the sheer inertia of stare decisis has deprived Illinois
plaintiffs, such as Robert Rickey, of redress for mental and emotional distress
when there is no contemporaneous physical impact. The source of this inertia
is the landmark case of Braun v. Craven,2 where the Illinois Supreme Court
denied recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress in the absence of
contemporaneous physical impact. This holding has been followed by Illinois
courts for eighty-two years, 3 notwithstanding dramatic advances in medical
science that have led most American jurisdictions to reject or modify the
physical impact rule. 4  Surprisingly, the Illinois Supreme Court has dis-
played no willingness to reconsider this issue despite a number of ideal recent
opportunities to do so.
This Article urges a change in Illinois law because the physical impact rule
is at variance with modern needs and concepts of justice. It is startling that
the Illinois Supreme Court has failed to recognize that a physical injury may
manifest itself in emotional trauma and, instead, continues to perpetuate a
rule so out of tune with contemporary circumstances. To understand this
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress after this issue went to print. Rickey v. Chicago
Transit Authority, - I11. App. 3d -, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1st Dist. 1981)).
2. 175 I11. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
3. See Cutright v. City Nat'l Bank, 88 Ill. App. 3d 742, 410 N.E.2d 1142 (3d Dist. 1980);
Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 I11. App. 3d 502, 308 N.E.2d 63 (4th Dist. 1978); Kaiser-
man v. Bright, 61 I11. App. 3d 767, 377 N E.2d 261 (1st Dist. 1978); Neuberg v. Michael Reese
Hosp. & Medical Center, 60 Ill. App. 3d 679, 377 N.E.2d 215 (1st Dist. 1978); Rosenberg v.
Packerland Packing Co., 55 Ill. App. 3d 959, 370 N.E.2d 1235 (1st Dist. 1977); Benza v.
Shulman Air Freight, 46 I11. App. 3d 521, 361 N.E.2d 91 (lst Dist. 1977).
4. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baldoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517,
579 P.2d 1163 (1978); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Sup. 164, 326 A.2d 129
(1973); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Stewart v. Gilliam, 271
So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Usry v. Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 118 S.E.2d 719 (1961);
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W.
1068 (1902); Whitsell v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 P. 401 (1916); Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill,
Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d
117 (Me. 1970); Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d
140 (1973); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); First Nat'l Bank v.
Langly, 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975); Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 802
(1934); Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N.W. 643 (1925); Chiuchiolo v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559,
214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961);
Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906); Held v. Red Malcuit, Inc., 12 Ohio
Misc. 158, 230 N.E.2d 674 (1967); Salmi v. Columbia & N. R.R., 146 P. 819 (Or. 1915);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I.
643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Mack v. South Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898);
Sterngafen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918); Memphis St. Ry. v. Bernstein, 137
Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978);
Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va.
27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Grimsby v. Sampson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 214 (1975); Waube
v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). States which still follow the impact rule
include: Peay v. Western Union Tel. Co., 64 Ark. 538, 43 S.W. 965 (1898); Braun v. Craven,
175 I11. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Jeffersonville Siglas, Inc. v. Wilson, 154 Ind. App. 398, 290
N.E.2d 113 (1972); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23
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anomaly, this Article deals with three major topics: (1) the historical devel-
opments in the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) the
Braun decision and Illinois' adherence to its obsolete result; and (3) judicial
lawmaking and the courts' duty to reform outmoded precedent. Because of
the judicially created impact rule's clear injustice this Article presents an
extended analysis of a plaintiff's right to redress when a victim of the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS:
A SERIES OF CHANGES AND ABANDONMENTS
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has undergone various
postures since its inception in this country. Although courts have been recep-
tive to the somewhat similar tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, the fear of both fraudulent claims and the extension of liability in
proportion to the tortfeasor's fault have resulted in arbitrary rules designed
to limit recovery when the tortious conduct was unintentional. Some juris-
dictions have recognized that the plaintiff in either case may have a legiti-
mate cause of action and should be able to recover upon sufficient proof to
the jury. A number of courts, however, have been reluctant to modify old
theories of liability, even though support for these theories has evaporated.
Consequently, the ability to recover for injuries incurred as a result of
negligently inflicted emotional distress may depend upon the state in which
the suit is brought and the ability to offer proof in satisfaction of question-
able rules laid down by courts of that state. At present, most jurisdictions
require satisfaction of one of three rules of recovery: the physical impact
rule, the zone of danger theory, or the Dillon foreseeability test.
Physical Impact Rule
In the landmark decision of Victorian Railways Commissioners v.
Coultas,5 an English tribunal in 1888 denied recovery for the physical results
of mental anguish absent a contemporaneous impact. The Coultas case
involved a gatekeeper who negligently allowed Mr. Coultas and his wife to
drive their buggy across a railroad crossing while a locomotive bore down on
them. Although an actual collision was averted, the plaintiffs allegedly
suffered severe shock and subsequent physical manifestations as a result of
their narrow escape." The court contended that the plaintiffs' injuries
would not normally be expected to result from the gatekeeper's negligent act
and then concluded that an award of damages would extend liability for the
negligent act beyond the fault of the tortfeasor. 7 The Coultas court clearly
S.W.2d 272 (1929); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton, 58 Nev. 133, 71 P.2d 1051 (1937); Butner
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Okla. 234, 37 P. 1087 (1894).
5. 13 App. Cas. 222 (Eng. 1888).
6. Id. at 223.
7. Id. at 225-26.
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struggled with the concept of physical injuries occasioned by mental anguish8
and its decision was prompted, in part, by the court's anticipation of future
dubious claims. Had the plaintiffs in Coultas actually been struck by the
train, it is reasonably certain that their claim would have been honored.
Hence, the gatekeeper and his employer were exempted from liability, not
because of the relationship of injuries to culpability, but because the plain-
tiffs successfully crossed the tracks before a collision could occur.
The reasoning of the Coultas court was readily adopted by the first Ameri-
can jurisdictions confronted with similar claims.9 As a result, the impact
requirement quickly became the majority rule in this country despite its
abandonment in England only thirteen years after its recognition. 10 The
New York Supreme Court's 1896 decision in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway "
is representative of the early American decisions. In Mitchell, the defendant's
horsecar bore down on the plaintiff as she waited to board a similar horsecar.
No impact occurred, but by the time the driver was able to bring the horses
under control, the plaintiff stood wedged between the horses' heads.' 2 The
court denied recovery despite the plaintiff's claims of unconsciousness, mis-
carriage, and subsequent illness. Echoing the English decision in Coultas, the
Mitchell court spoke of unforeseeable injuries and fraudulent claims and held
that no recovery could be maintained for fright-induced injuries, even
though the injuries might be "nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a
miscarriage.' 3  In addition, the court reiterated the fear expressed in
8. Although medical evidence was offered at the trial to show that Mrs. Coultas suffered
severe shock, delicate health, impaired memory and eyesight subsequent to the accident, id. at
224, the court warned:
Not only in such a case as the present, but in every case where an accident caused by
negligence had given a person a serious nervous shock, there might be a claim for
damages on account of mental injury. The difficulty which now often exists in cases
of alleged physical injuries of determining whether they were caused by the negli-
gent act would be greatly increased, and a wide field opened for imaginary claims.
Id. at 225-26.
9. See Braun v. Craven, 175 I11. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1899); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47
N.E. 88 (1897); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio
St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. By,, 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340
(1892). But see Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Mack v. South
Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
10. Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 KB. 669. In Dulieu, the plaintiff was tending bar in
her husband's public house when the defendant's servant negligently drove a horse-drawn van
onto the premises. The pregnant woman sustained severe shock and illness and later gave birth
prematurely to a child who was "an idiot." Id. at 670. In granting recovery, the court held that
if physical injuries are naturally and directly caused by nervous shock, a rule which would bar
all claims based on public policy and the prevention of fraudulent lawsuits should not be
adopted. Id. at 681.
11. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
12. Id. at 108, 45 N.E. at 354.
13. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354. According to the court, if the plaintiff presented a valid cause
of action, recovery would be allowed, "however slight the injury." On the other hand, if no
cause of action existed, recovery would be denied, "no matter how grave or serious the conse-
quences." Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354.
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expressed in Coultas of a floodgate of false claims grounded on the theory of
negligently inflicted mental distress. 4
It is apparent, then, that the four basic arguments emerging from the early
cases-the fear of frivolous claims, refusal to recognize the extension of
liability theory, the medical sciences' difficulty in proving causation between
damages and the alleged fright, and the anxiety that such a rule might
precipitate a flood of litigation-were all based on policy rather than on
strict logic or legal analysis. Yet careful analysis demonstrates the flaws in
these contentions. First, the possibility of fabricated claims exists whether the
alleged injuries arise from a physical impact or emotional anguish. Recogniz-
ing this, courts and commentators have contended that the requirement of
sufficient proof before a jury will weed out fraudulent suits.' 5 In addition,
many courts have questioned the logic of denying all claims simply because
some may be false.' 6
The extension of liability argument carries some weight; yet, courts have
long recognized that "as between the tortfeasor who started the chain of
circumstances resulting in the injury and the entirely innocent plaintiff, the
tortfeasor should suffer the consequences.' 7  Indeed, the refusal to extend
14. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
15. See Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (while adherence
to impact rule implies judicial system is incapable of weeding out fraudulent claims, the bench,
bar, jury, and medical profession are equal to the task); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401,
410-11, 261 A.2d 84, 88-89 (1970) (unlikely that factual, medical, or legal charlatans will
emerge from a trial unmasked in modern times); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 655,
338 A.2d 524, 532 (1975) (courts should weigh the quality and genuineness of proof, contempo-
rary sophistication of the medical profession, and the ability of the court and jury to weed out
dishonest claims); Dulieu v. White & Sons,. [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 681 (jury should have no more
trouble in deciding merits of case whether injuries arise with or without impact). See also W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PaossEa, TopTs] (careful scrutiny of evidence required to distinguish valid and fabricated
claims); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REv. 761, 886 (1933) (weakness, if any, of plaintiff's
case will be determined via use of traditional negligence analysis).
16. See D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 655, 338 A.2d 524, 530 (1975) (reluctant to
bar an entire class of claims because of occasional fraudulent suit); Dulieu v. White & Sons,
[1901] 2 K.B. 669, 681 (adoption of a rigid rule denies redress for meritorious claims); McNiece,
Psychic Injury and Tort Liability In New York, 24 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1, 31 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as McNiece] (denial of all claims in order to prevent dishonest ones stretches public policy
to the breaking point).
According to an English tribunal, the "[f]ear that unfounded claims may be put forward,
and may result in erroneous conclusions of fact, ought not to influence us to impose legal
limitations as to the nature of the facts that it is permissible to prove." Owens v. Liverpool
Corp., [1939] 1 K.B. 394, 400. Two years later, the Supreme Court of Connecticut echoed those
sentiments in rejecting the physical impact rule. "Certainly it is a very questionable position for a
court to take, that because of the possibility of encouraging fictitious claims compensation should
be denied those who have actually suffered serious injury through the negligence of another."
Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 239, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941).
17. McNiece, supra note 16, at 16. According to Prosser, "the law of torts is a battleground
of social theory. Its primary purpose, of course, is to make a fair adjustment of the conflicting
claims of the litigating parties." PaossEB, TORTS, supra note 15, at 14-15. In most cases, such an
adjustment results in a finding of liability. The courts will draw the line, however, where the
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liability may prompt arbitrary results. The Coultas case illustrates a situation
where, but for the plaintiffs' narrow escape, a collision would have occurred
and the defendants would have been subject to liability. Ironically, plain-
tiffs' diligence dictated their failure in court.
Third, the argument that mental injuries are too difficult to substantiate
was perhaps valid when Coultas and Mitchell were decided. Some of the
early decisions, however, reflected an insensitivity to mental or emotional
injuries by repeatedly referring to "mere words and gestures" and persons of
"peculiarly nervous temperament[s]." 8  These jurists, perhaps, felt that
such claims were improper rather than unjustified. Courts have subsequently
recognized that this position is at odds with a growing body of medical
learning"' that casts serious doubts upon the common assertion that mental
and emotional injuries are too tenuous or superficial to be tested or diag-
nosed. 20 Although this may have been true when Coultas and Mitchell were
consequences of the negligent actor's conduct are so remote as to be "unforeseeable" by the
"reasonable man." E.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Eng. Co., [1961] A.C. 388. Cf. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.
1964) (if some harm to plaintiff is foreseeable, the unforeseeability of extent of harm no bar to
recovery); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting) (every person has a duty of care to protect society); In re Polemis [1921] 3 K.B. 560
(all damages are recoverable under a theory of direct causation).
18. Braun v. Craven, 175 111. 401, 406-07, 51 N.E. 657, 659 (1898). One court refused to
recognize "so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory, and so speculative a cause of action as
mere mental disturbance." Huston v. Freemansberg, 212 Pa. 540, 550, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (1905).
See also Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900) (reference to
possession of "ordinary physical and mental vigor"); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 163 Mass.
285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (reference to "timid" or "sensitive" plaintiffs); Renner v. Canfield, 36
Minn. 90, 30 N.W. .435 (1886) (reference to one's "delicate state of health"). One commentator
has even remarked that "[a]gainst a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing
temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental
hide is a better protection than the law could ever be." Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
19. According to a Florida appellate court: "The question of proving or disproving causation
between the claimed injuries and damages and the alleged fright or shock may indeed have been
a difficult undertaking in 1883 when the impact rule was first announced. Such is not the
situation today." Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Accord,
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38, (1961)
(courts must rely on sophistication of medical profession); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401,
406, 261 A.2d 84, 86 (1970) (new equipment, research, improved education, diagnostic tech-
niques, and better understanding of disease in general allow courts today to deal with mental
and emotional injuries); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 359, 124 N.W.2d 312, 317-18 (1963)
(because psychiatry and clinical psychology can today provide reliable information concerning
psychological distress, no reason exists to follow the impact rule). One commentator has re-
marked that at the time the impact rule was propounded, "medical science was in its infancy"
and "insanity and other emotional illnesses were considered to be the result of one's own sins."
Liebson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15
J. FAM. L. 163, 163-64 (1976-77).
20. See, e.g., Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 550, 61 A. 1022, 1023
(1905) (court refused to acknowledge "so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory, and so
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decided, today the physical and psychological consequences of emotional
distress have become the subject of an increasingly large number of medicial
studies.2  More refined methods of measurement2 and documentation 3 of
the effects of emotional distress have "moved the methodology from the
pseudo-scientific to the scientific, testable area. ' 24 Recent studies have doc-
umented the physical effects of emotional distress, citing increases in the
speculative a cause of action as mere mental disturbance"), See also notes 8, 13, & 18 and
accompanying text supra.
21. One survey of the existing literature indicates that between 1965 and 1975 over 300
publications appeared on the subject. Hull, Life Circumstances and Physical Illness: A Cross
Disciplinary Survey of Research Content and Methodfor the Decade 1965/75, 21 J. PSYCHOSO-
MATIC RESEARCH 115, 115 (1977).
22. See Buell & Sime, Quantitation of Physiological Response to Emotional Stress, 75 J.S.C.
MED. A. 555 (1979) (elastic modulus, a method used to classify human physiologic responses as
dimensional strain patterns, has been found to be useful in quantifying the relationship between
emotional stress and human behavior within the area of stress testing); Schiffer, Hartley,
Shulman & Abelman, The Quiz Electrocardiogram: A New Diagnostic and Research Technique
for Evaluating the Relation Between Emotional Stress and Ischemic Heart Disease, 37 AM. J.
CARDIOLOcY 41 (1976) (measurement of the heart rate while patient under stress found to be
useful in predicting ischemic heart disease).
Successful efforts have also been made to quantify the magnitude of life events. See Holmes &
Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 11 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 213 (1967). Life
events are occurrences in an individual's life which require some degree of adaptation. As stated
by one commentator: "A characteristic feature of the life events which predict illness is that they
necessitate the termination of customary pursuits and/or social contacts, and sometimes the
initiation of new ones." Totman, What Makes 'Life Events' Stressful? A Retrospective Study of
Patients Who Have Suffered a First Myocardial Infarction, 23 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 193,
193 (1979). See also Holmes & Masuda, Life Change and Illness Susceptibility [hereinafter cited
as Holmes & Masuda] in STRESSFUL LIFE EVENTS: THEIR NATURE AND EFFECTS 46 (B. Dohrenwend
& B. Dohrenwend eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as STRESSFUL LIF EVENTS] ("The emphasis is on
change from the existing steady state and not on psychological meaning, emotion, or social
desirability"). By means of a written questionnaire within a sample of 394 subjects, an attempt
was made to estimate the magnitude of a life event with respect to the intensity and length of
time necessary to accommodate the event. Of the 43 life events listed, the death of a spouse
ranked first, employee retirement ranked tenth, a mortgage over $10,000 ranked twentieth,
trouble with a person's boss ranked thirtieth, and minor violations of the law ranked last.
Holmes & Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 11 J. PYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 217
(1967). The authors concluded: "The high degree of consensus also suggests a universal agree-
ment between groups and among individuals about the significance of the life events under study
that transcends differences in age, sex, marital status, education, social class, generation Ameri-
can, religion, and race." Id.
23. See Totman, What Makes 'Life Events' Stressful? A Retrospective Study of Patients Who
Have Suffered a First Myocardial Infarction, 23 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 193, 193 (1979) ("A
substantial body of evidence from several different disciplines supports the hypothesis that a
person's susceptibility to physical illness is influenced by the recent incidence of 'life events'
involving social change."). See generally STRESSFUL LIFE EVENTS, supra note 22; Rabkin &
Struening, Life Events, Stress, and Illness, 194 SCIENCE 1013 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rabkin
& Struening].
24. Kuller, Epidemiology of Stress-Related Cardiovascular Disease, 75 J.S.C. MED. A. 521,
529 (1979).
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incidence of cardiovascular disease, 25 cancer, 26 diabetes, 27 multiple sclero-
sis,28 hypertension, 2 lower back pain,30 various other illnesses3' and pro-
found psychiatric disorders,32 and have demonstrated statistically significant
correlations between these maladies and emotionally stressful occurrences or
life events. 33 In fact, at least one study has found a direct relationship
between the magnitude of a life event and the risk of a health change. 34 In
addition, it has been determined that there is a strong positive relationship
between the magnitude of the life crisis and the seriousness of the resulting
illness.3 5 Further, it has been proven that physical symptoms are by no means
25. Buell & Eliot, Stress and Cardiovascular Disease, 75 J.S.C. MED. A. 494 (1979) ("The
current interest in the relationship between stress and cardiovascular disease stems from a sizable
body of evidence implicating psychosocial conflict, emotions and patterns of behavior in the
pathogenesis of cardiovascular disease, arrhythmias and sudden death"); Jenkins, Recent Evi-
dence Supporting Psychologic and Social Risk Factors for Coronary Disease, 295 NEw ENcLANO
J. MED. 987 (1976) ("Recent publications reinforce the hypothesis that life dissatisfactions may
serve as a precursor to angina pectoris and perhaps also to myocardial infarction"). Accord,
Ahlbom, Impact of Psychological Stress on Ischemic Heart Disease When Controlling for Con-
ventional Risk Indicators, 6 J. HUMAN STRESS 7 (1980); Wilhelmsen, Stress and Coronary Heart
Disease, 10 AUSTL. N.S. MED. 135 (1980).
26. Bahnson, Stress and Cancer: The State of the Art, 21 PSYCHOSOMATICS 975 (1980) ("there
can be little doubt that a subtle relationship exists between loss and depression and the clinical
onset or exacerbation of cancer .. ").
27. Bradley, Life Events and the Control of Diabetes Mellitus, 23 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RE-
SEARCH 159 (1979) (experience of stressful life events found to be associated with disturbances of
diabetic control).
28. Poser, Trauma Stress and Multiple Sclerosis, 7 BULL. AM. AcAD. PsYcH. L. 209 (1979)
("[t]rauma and stress must be considered precipitating factors, not causal ones").
29. Henry & Cassel, Psychosocial Factors in Essential Hypertension, 90 AM. J. EPIDEMiOL-
OGY 171 (1969) (recent experimental studies show link between unfulfilled social needs and
development of high blood pressure).
30. Leavitt, Carron, & BiEliaukas, Stressing Life Events and the Experience of Low Back
Pain, 23 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 49 (1979) ("There are . . . significant relationships be-
tween the occurrence of life events and how pain is experienced within our total low back pain
sample").
31. See generally STRESSFUL LIF EVENTS, supra note 22; Murphy, Life Events, Pscyhiatric
Disturbance and Physical Illness, 136 BRIT. J. PsYcH. 326 (1980); Rabkin & Struening, supra
note 23; Racy, Stress and Human Disease: An Overview and Background, 37 Amz. MED. 352
(1980).
32. See note 23 supra.
33. See note 22 supra.
34. Holmes & Masuda, supra note 22, at 61. This study indicated that for those in the sample
who had experienced a "mild" life crisis, 37% had an associated health change within two years;
for those who had experienced a "moderate" crisis, 51 % had an associated health change within
two years; and for those who had experienced a "major" life crisis, 71% had an associated health
change within two years.
A "mild" life crisis was defined as an event which had an associated value of between 150 and
199 life-change units, units which represented values to various life events in one year. Id. at 58.
A life crisis was defined as any clustering of life-change events whose values summed to 150
life-change units or more within the one year period. Id. at 59. A "moderate" life crisis was
defined as an event which had an associated value of between 200 and 299 life-change units. Id.
at 58. A "major" life crisis was defined as an event which had an associated value of 300 or more
life change units. Id.
35. Id. at 68. The health changes that are documented include psychiatric as well as medical
and surgical diseases. Id. Thirty-four varieties of disease were categorized into seven types:
1981] INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 303
the only element of damage as the victim of a personal catastrophe may
remain physically unaffected but suffer profound psychological injury. 3
Thus, medical science has demonstrated the effects of mental illness and
the psychological injury resulting from emotional distress, and it can no
longer be argued that psychological injuries are incapable of being measured
or that their effects are inherently speculative. This is not to say that medical
science is exacting in the area of detection, measurement, or controlled
treatment of emotional illness. Significant advances, however, have been
made, and have been one impetus for courts that have abandoned the
physical impact rule.
The final argument against recovery, that a floodgate of litigation might
result, is employed for cumulative effect rather than analytical support.
Decisions following precedent in the face of changes in circumstances have
often reverted to the time-worn contention that a flood of lawsuits would
result from increased access to the courts. 37  In fact, however, states that
infectious and parasitic, allergic, musculoskeletal, psychosomatic, psychiatric, physical trauma,
and miscellaneous. Forty-five percent were infectious, 13% were allergic, 11% were muscu-
loskeletal and 7% were psychosomatic. Id. at 58.
36. Karas, Kaltreider & Horowitz, Responses to Catastrophe: A Case Study, 38 DisEAsEs
NERvous Sys. 625 (1977). For instance, a young woman witnessed two consecutive events, the
fatal shooting of her fiance at the hands of her father and the suicide of her father. No significant
physiological complications resulted, but the woman encountered significant difficulty in coping
with the loss of her fiance and with her anger toward her father. Id. at 626. Following a pattern
familar to psychiatrists, the woman initially denied the experience, avoiding the angry feelings
toward her father and speaking idealistically of her fiance as though he were still alive. The
woman then endured intense periods of anger and anxiety over the incident that oscillated with
further periods of denial. As a result, she experienced difficulty in all phases of her life, at one
point dropping out of school, and only after four months of counselling was the woman able to
leave therapy, re-enroll in school, and continue to live a normal life.
A vast body of literature has developed on the nature and treatment of severe psychological
injury. See, e.g., Krieger, Rosenfeld, Gordon & Bennett, Problems in the Psychotherapy of
Children with Histories of Incest, 34 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 81 (1980) (found that molested
children tend to feel physically and morally helpless, defiant, precociously mature, angry,
anxious, and ashamed and detailed the "special problems which arise in the individual psycho-
therapy of children with histories of incest"); Melges & DeMaso, Grief-Resolution Therapy:
Reliving, Revising, and Revisiting, 35 Am. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 51 (1970) (grief-resolution therapy
indicated for the treatment of unresolved grief reactions "whereby the patient removes obstacles
to grieving through reliving, revising and revisiting events of the loss"); Petti & Wells, Crisis
Treatment of a Preadolescent Who Accidentally Killed His Twin, 34 Am. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 434
(1980) ("It is anticipated that such intensive treatment can shorten both the duration of institu,
tional care and the morbidity of highly vulnerable children such as the patient described").
37. According to Prosser, "[t]he courts always have stood more or less in dread of a 'flood of
litigation' involving problems which they are not prepared to deal with. " Paossm, TORTS, supra
note 15, at 21 (emphasis added). See also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 735, 441 P.2d 912, 917,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 (1968) (pressing need for legal redress reflected by a multitude of claims);
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969) (a
wrong requires a remedy, despite the burden on the courts); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401,
412, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970) (fear of increased caseload should not result in limited access to
judicial forum).
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have allowed liberal recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress
have escaped the dreaded flood. "
Recognizing the harsh consequences of the physical impact rule, most
jurisdictions have sought alternative methods to allow limited recovery. The
most conservative states have adopted a token impact doctrine allowing
recovery as long as some impact, no matter how trivial, can be shown. 39
Although states following such a rule are perhaps more sensitive to a plaintiff
than the states that still cling to the old impact rule, such a token doctrine
also suffers from the same misguided logic. If the pro-recovery arguments
regarding foreseeability of injuries, liability of the negligent actor, difficulty
of proof, and the possibility of fabricated lawsuits carry any validity at all,
then the problems surrounding them are not alleviated by the token impact
doctrine.
Zone of Danger
To escape the restrictive consequences of the physical impact rule, several
jurisdictions have allowed recovery for physical reactions to mental distress if
the plaintiff was directly endangered by the defendant's conduct. The so-
called zone of danger theory was first adopted by an English court in the
1925 decision in Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers.40 In that case, a mother and
38. According to a Florida appellate court:
To perpetuate the old impact rule on the basis that its rejection would precipitate a
flood of litigation, is an unsatisfactory and tenuous contention. In those states
allowing recovery for psychic injuries without impact, the feared 'floodgate of
litigation' has simply not appeared. Nor has it been demonstrated that the amount of
litigation in those states with no impact rule is greater than in those states with the
impact rule. A fear of expansive litigation should not deter courts from granting
relief in meritorious cases. The fundamental concept of justice under the law would
reject any rule that measures availability of a forum on a nebulous principle of a
floodgate of litigation or a virtual avalanche of cases.
Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa.
146, 162-63, 404 A.2d 672, 680 (1979) for a discussion of the California experience since the
Dillon decision.
39. See Israel v. Ulrich, 114 Conn. 599, 159 A. 634 (1922) (jostling in an automobile);
Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929)
(slight burn); Homans v. Boston Elevated R.R., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (slight bump
against car seat); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in the
eyes); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 369 (1930) (inhalation of smoke).
At least one tribunal which pursued such practice has admitted that where "injuries, even
though trivial or minor in character" exist, "mental suffering is a legitimate element of dam-
ages." Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 589, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955). Fifteen years
after the Potere decision, the same jurisdiction repudiated the trivial impacts doctrine. Nieder-
man v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 34 (1970). In Niederman, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania questioned the logic of the Potere decision:
[The rule against recovery] has only been applied where there is absolutely no
impact whatsoever. Once there is even the slightest impact, it has been held that the
plaintiff can recover for any damages which resulted from the accompanying fright,
even though the impact had no causal connection with the fright-induced injuries.
436 Pa. at 406-07, 261 A.2d at 86 (emphasis in original).
40. [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
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her child were placed in imminent danger by a cart that allegedly had been
negligently secured at the top of a hill. The mother in Hambrook managed to
escape the onrushing cart, but suffered emotional distress and other conse-
quences at the sight of her child being struck. 4' The court held that the
defendant breached a duty of care to the mother and that it was therefore
reasonably foreseeable that she would be injured. The fact that her injuries
were manifested in an unexpected manner did not bar the plaintiff from
recovery . 42
Once again American courts took the British lead and, as early as 1925 and
as recently as 1972, recognized the zone of danger theory as a viable alterna-
tive to the physical impact rule. 43  Representative of the American courts'
position is Robb v. Pennsylvania Railroad,44 where the Delaware court,
faced with facts similar to those found in Victorian Railways v. Coultas,
abandoned the impact doctrine in favor of the zone of danger requirement.
The Robb case arose when plaintiff's automobile stalled at a railroad grade
crossing due to a deep rut negligently permitted to form by the defendant.
While attempting to move the vehicle, plaintiff saw the defendant's train
approaching and fled the vehicle seconds before the train collided with it. 45
The Delaware court noted the sharp diversity in judicial opinions regarding
the right to recover for the physical consequences of fright in the absence of a
contemporaneous physical impact, 46 including the rejection of the require-
ment by the jurisdiction in which it originated. 47 In contrast to the early
American decisions supporting the impact doctrine, the Robb decision recog-
nized the plaintiff's right to be free from emotional disturbance and allowed
the plaintiff to recover under the established negligence analysis. 48  The
court thus discarded both the physical impact and token impact doctrines
despite the feared increase in volume of cases, the danger of fraudulent suits,
and the difficulty of proof.
41. Id. at 142.
42. Id. at 151, 156-57.
43. States adopting the zone of danger test as an alternative to the impact rule include the
following: Colorado: Towns v. Anderson, 175 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978); Delaware: Robb
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Maryland: Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md.
479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Minnesota: Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034
(1892); Nebraska: Manford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 203 N.W. 643 (Neb. 1925); Tennessee:
Memphis Street R.R. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.E. 902 (1917); Vermont: Savard v.
Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967); Wisconsin: Colla v. Mandrella, I Wis.
2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
44. 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965).
45. Id. at 455, 210 A.2d at 710.
46. Id. at 458, 210 A.2d at 711.
47. See note 10 supra for a discussion of Dulieu v. White & Sons.
48. According to the Supreme Court of Delaware:
Where negligence proximately caused fright to a person within the immediate area
of physical danger from that negligence, which in turn produced physical conse-
quences such as would be elements of damage if a bodily injury had been suffered,
the injured party is entitled to recover under an application of the prevailing
principles of law as to negligence and proximate cause.
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 58 Del. 454, 464, 210 A.2d 709, 714-15.
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In 1965, the American Law Institute joined the states that had adopted
positions similar to the Robb decision by recognizing the zone of danger
theory.49 The Second Restatement of Torts even borrowed the fact pattern
of Mitchell v. Rochester Railway as a case in which recovery should be
allowed. 50 In settling on the zone of danger requirement, the American
Law Institute revised its earlier opinion that "the testimony necessary to
establish the causal relation between the actor's negligence and the other's
illness or bodily harm" may be unreliable and, thus, insufficient to sustain a
cause of action.51
The zone of danger requirement has been praised by some commentators
as a way to ensure genuine claims and to guard against extending the
negligent actor's liability to unforeseeable consequences. 52 In practice, it
restricts actions and yet allows recovery when proof is offered of injuries
arising from the defendant's breach of duty to the plaintiff. The rule has also
been criticized, however, for being as arbitrary as its predecessors. According
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the zone of danger requirement "would
bar recovery depending upon the position of the plaintiff at the time of the
event. '"" The contention has also been put forth that, in a case such as
49. The pertinent section of the Second Restatement reads as follows:
§ 436. Physical Harm Resulting from Emotional Disturbance
(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect
another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor should recog-
nize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results
solely through the internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance
does not protect the actor from liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing
bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other
similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely
from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbances does not
protect the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the other
results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family
occurring in his presence.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 436, Comment c, Illustration 2 (1965). See notes
11-14 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the Mitchell case.
51. Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 406 n.3, 261 A.2d 84, 86 n.3 (1970) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1931)).
52. See Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 487, 86 A. 879, 883 (1952) (if recovery were
granted to plaintiff outside zone of danger, an unjustified extension of liability to world at large
would result); Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N.H. 198, 201, 165 A. 715, 717 (1933) (zone of danger
includes expectable persons and expectable risks); H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Perez, 408 S.W.2d
576, 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (physical injuries resulting from fright are reasonably foreseeable
where plaintiff was in the zone of danger); Colla v. Mandrella, I Wis. 2d 594, 599-600, 85
N.W.2d 345, 348 (1957) (injury was not too remote in time or place or sequence of events from
defendant's negligent act where plaintiff was in th6 zone of danger); Comment, The Common
Law Treatment in Wisconsin of the Right to Recover for Emotional Harm, 1977 Wis. L. REV.
1089, 1106 (zone of danger test designed to insure genuine claims and set reasonable limits on
defendant's liability).
53. Sinn. v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 157, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (1979). In contrast, in Dillon v.
Legg, the decedent's death was witnessed by his sister who was within the zone of danger, and
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Hambrook, the plaintiff's distress would most likely arise from the danger to
the loved one rather than to the plaintiff. Indeed, this has been recognized
and sanctioned by the Second Restatement.5 4 The zone of danger theory,
then, although not a satisfactory resolution represents a step forward from
the impact rule.
Dillon Foreseeability
Another viable alternative to the impact doctrine was the extension of duty
based upon relationship rather than impact. In the leading decision of Dillon
v. Legg, 55 California became the first American jurisdiction to grant recov-
ery to a bystander who witnessed her child's death but was not herself
physically struck or within the zone of danger. The California Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff should be able to recover if: (1) she was in close
proximity to the accident; (2) she was closely related to the victim; and (3)
she suffered severe shock and physical consequences as a result of a sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident. 5  The court recognized
that the law of torts would hold defendants responsible for the reasonably
foreseeable injuries they cause. 57  Accordingly, the court set forth the test
that the facts of each case should determine whether the harm to the plaintiff
was reasonably foreseeable.
Jurisdictions that have followed the Dillon decision 5 have not advocated
legal redress for every plaintiff claiming fright, shock, or distress. Were this
the case, the restrictive rationales supporting the physical impact and zone of
by his mother who was not in the zone of danger. Under a strict zone of danger analysis, the
sister would have been allowed to recover damages for the emotional distress and physical
consequences she suffered, but her mother would have been denied recovery. The Dillon court
disdained such an arbitrary result and, in allowing recovery for the sister and mother, refused to
distinguish between the "zone of danger of physical impact" and the "zone of danger of
emotional impact." 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436, Comment f (1965) (rule in Subsection (2)
applies even though plaintiffs shock is due to fear for safety of spouse or child because defendant
has breached duty to plaintiff and fact that injury arises in unexpected or unusual manner is of
no consequence).
55. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See note 53 supra for the facts
confronting the court in Dillon.
56. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey added a fourth requirement to the Dillon test-the victim must suffer death or serious
physical danger. In addition, the recovery granted may be reduced by the proportion of the
injured party's negligence and any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Portee v.
Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980).
57. See generally PaossER, TORTS, supra note 15, at 250-70 for a discussion of foreseeability.
58. Connecticut: D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Sup. 164, 326 A.2d 129
(1973); Hawaii: Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 390, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Massachusetts:
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Michigan: Toms v. McCon-
nell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); New Jersey: Portee v. Jaffee, 34 N.J. 88, 417
A.2d 521 (1980); Pennsylvania: Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Rhode Island:
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Texas: Landreth v. Reed, 570
S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Washington: Grimsby v. Sampson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530
P.2d 291 (1975).
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danger rules would be legitimate and the gates would indeed be opened to a
flood of claims, many of them fraudulent. Instead, the test set forth in Dillon
recognizes the responsibility of the judiciary to deal with cases on their
merits, rejecting the notion that the concept of reasonable foreseeability
supports adherence to the zone of danger theory or impact rule. 59
The Dillon foreseeability test is an attractive alternative to the impact rule
for several reasons: it follows a traditional negligence analysis, incorporating
as necessary elements proximate cause and duty;60 it affirms the contention
of many commentators that concern over fraud is without justification; 6 1 it
recognizes advances in psychology and psychiatry as well as the ability of the
judge and jury to determine whether a causal relationship exists and to
measure damages;6 2 finally, and perhaps most importantly, it places a duty
on the courts to allow a cause of action to honest, sincere claimants. As the
Delaware Supreme Court remarked in Robb v. Pennsylvania Railway:
Justice is not best served, we think, when compensation is denied to one
who has suffered injury through the negligence of another merely because
of the possibility of encouraging fictitious claims in other cases. Public
59. Prosser concedes that "the danger of claims without merit is a real one" and that the
difficulty lies in distinguishing valid claims from false ones and serious injuries from trivial ones.
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MwCH. L. REV. 874, 877
(1939). He contends, however, that valid claimants will be reimbursed if they are able to
introduce sufficient proof and that the court will draw the line between serious and trivial
injuries via employment of the" 'rule of reason,' the 'fair return,' and the standard of conduct of
the 'reasonable man'...." Id. at 877-78. Dillon allows courts to draw the line along similar
boundaries, although perhaps more circumscribed. Indeed, the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress is one given to perhaps arbitrary linedrawing by the courts. As Prosser asserts,
"the limits to be set are a matter for the practical common sense of the court, and probably
incapable of reduction to any definite rule." Id. at 892. Nonetheless, the Dillon court has
fashioned a rule which should prove to be more definite, more logical, and, thus, more valuable
than either the physical impact doctrine or the zone of danger theory.
60. The Dillon formula represents a logical analysis and should prove to be more reliable
than the impact rule. In addition, the foreseeability test, which judges cases on their individual
merits, lends itself to the traditional negligence analysis. As one commentator pointed out:
[Such cases] should be dealt with by some variation of the negligence formula
appropriate to the particular case, and if the case satisfies the requirements of the
formula, recovery should be allowed. If it does not, recovery should not be allowed.
There is no reason why the fact that the injury was received through fright [in the
absence of a physical impact] should be of any peculiar importance. The inquiry
ought to be: Did the defendant owe plaintiff a duty, the violation of which caused
plaintiff damage?
Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 761, 886 (1933).
61. See note 15 supra regarding the courts' ability to distinguish fabricated suits from valid
ones. See also Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between
California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1, 13 (1976) (modern trend is to reject fraud as
grounds for denying relief); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REV. 260, 276
(1920) (desire to avoid fraudulent claims never given weight where plaintiff proves existence of
injuries). Note, Bystander's Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, 29 ARK. L. REV.
562, 564-65 (1976) (rule which seeks to bar fraud by denying all claims is scarcely in keeping
with ideals of the judicial system).
62. Spe note 15 supra.
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policy requires the courts with the aid of the legal and medical professions
to find ways and means to solve satisfactorily the problems thus pre-
sented-not expedient ways to avoid them.6 3
By extending the concept of duty and developing a rational nexus between
negligent conduct and the injury sued upon, the Dillon foreseeability test has
demonstrated that a reasonable parameter can be drawn to the field of legal
liability, thus allowing liability to extend beyond the zone of danger.8 4
It is clear that the physical impact rule is anachronistic and ill-founded. It
is equally clear that the zone of danger and foreseeability tests, widely
followed throughout the United States, represent the better, more progres-
sive view. Despite this undeniable trend away from the physical impact
doctrine, Illinois still clings to the impact rule because the Illinois Supreme
Court has refused to consider the problem.
ILLINOIS ADHERENCE TO THE OBSOLESCENT PRECEDENT OF
BRAUN v. CRAVEN
Since 1898, Illinois courts have followed the rule announced in Braun v.
Craven6 5 that denies recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress
unless such injuries were incurred as a result of, or simultaneously with,
physical impact. The several districts of the Illinois Appellate Court have
steadfastly refused to abandon or modify this rule, not so much because they
approve of it, but because the supreme court has not abrogated it. In Braun,
the plaintiff was helping her sister move from her apartment when her
sister's landlord, Mr. Craven, noticed the moving van. Believing that Braun's
sister intended to move in violation of her lease, Craven charged angrily
upstairs and confronted the plaintiff. He loosed a tirade of vile and abusive
language at Mrs. Braun, causing her great emotional distress and eventually
chorea, a nervous disorder attributed to severe shock.6 6
The supreme court, while acknowledging the plaintiff's injuries, held that
no recovery would attach for negligent infliction of mental distress absent a
contemporaneous physical impact,67 relying heavily upon public policy to
reach this result. Although a reasonable person in the defendant's position
might have realized that such conduct would have caused the plaintiff
discomfort, the court decided that under normal circumstances the actual
injuries incurred by Mrs. Braun were not likely to result.66  The court held
that, absent an actual battery, the injuries were unforeseeable.6, Thus,
63. 58 Del. 454, 464, 210 A.2d 709, 714 (1965).
64. See notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text supra.
65. 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
66. Id. at 401-05, 51 N.E. at 657-59.
67. Id. at 420, 51 N.E. at 664.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 408, 51 N.E. at 660. Here, the Braun court relied upon a statement made in
Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Stables, 62 I11. 313, 320-21 (1872):
[W]e cannot readily understand how there can be pain without mental suffering. It
is a mental emotion arising from a physical injury. It is the mind that either feels or
1981]
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Braun failed in her attempt to prove that her injuries were proximately
caused by the defendant's negligence.
Similar to other early physical impact decisions, Braun reflected the once
prevalent notion that mental or emotional injuries deserve less protection
than physical injuries, and that people who complain of mental disturbances
are merely too sensitive to their environment. 7  Braun also evinced the
familiar concern that because mental injuries were not as easily susceptible
of proof as physical injuries, juries would improperly reward damages to
insincere claimants. The court, therefore, required proof of an antecedent
physical impact or injury as a means to stem the anticipated flood of frivo-
lous and fraudulent claims. 71
Recent decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court, however, have openly
expressed hostility toward the impact doctrine, acknowledging that the rule
is illogical and obsolete.7 2  Further, the appellate court has effectively
eroded Braun by permitting recovery for mental distress in cases of contem-
poraneous property damage but no physical injury. 73 As discussed below,
Braun has been followed in Illinois only because the appellate court has
determined that the authority to fashion tort law rests exclusively with the
Illinois Supreme Court, a court unwilling to repudiate Braun.14
takes cognizance of physical pain, and hence there is mental anguish or suffering
inseparable from bodily injury, unless the mind is overpowered and consciousness is
destroyed. The mental anguish which would not be proper to be considered is where
it is not connected with the bodily injury, but was caused by some mental concep-
tion, not arising from the physical injury.
See City of Chicago v. McLean, 133 II1. 148, 153, 24 N.E. 527, 528 (1890) (mental anguish is a
product of physical injury). See also note 79 and accompanying text infra.
70. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
71. 175 Ill. at 420, 51 N.E. at 664. The Braun court concluded:
The action is purely one of negligence, and if appellee could be held liable under this
evidence, then any person who might so speak or act as to cause a stranger of
peculiar sensibility passing by to sustain a nervous shock productive of serious injury
might be held liable. Thus, one whose very existence was unknown to the party
guilty of so speaking and acting would be given a right of recovery. . . . On the
ground of public policy alone, having reference to the dangerous use to be made of
such cause of action, we hold that a liability cannot exist consequent on mere fright
or terror which superinduces nervous shock.
Id. at 420, 51 N.E. at 664. Accord, Horan v. Klein's-Sheridan, Inc., 62 111. App. 2d 455, 459-60,
211 N.E.2d 116, 118 (3d Dist. 1965) (permitted recovery foe mental suffering caused by personal
injury); Budek v. City of Chicago, 279 Ill. App. 410, 427 (1st Dist. 1935) (recovery permitted for
mental pain directly and necessarily caused by physical pain); Chicago City Ry. v. Canevin, 72
I11. App. 81, 90 (1st Dist. 1897) (mental pain not directly caused by physical pain cannot be
compensated). See Pinkley v. C. & E. I. R.R., 246 I11. 370, 380, 92 N.E. 896, 900 (1910) (Braun
established measure of damages for negligence); CarlinvifleNat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 Ill. App.
3d 502, 503, 380 N.E.2d 63, 65 (4th Dist. 1978) (Braun is firmly rooted in Illinois); Benza v.
Schulman Air Freight, 46 I11. App. 3d 521, 523, 361 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1st Dist. 1977) (appellate
courts are bound by Braun).
72. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text infra.
73. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text infra.
74. The language used by the appellate court in Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 Ill.
App. 3d 502, 505, 380 N.E.2d 63, 66 (4th Dist. 1978) is typical:
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Despite the appellate court's deferential posture, it has acknowledged that
the physical impact rule is difficult to reconcile with the supreme court's
recognition of a separate tort action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 75 For example, in Carlinville National Bank v. Rhoads,71 the plain-
tiff suffered emotional damage after witnessing her husband's death in an
automobile accident. 77 The Rhoads court conceded that emotional distur-
bances caused by negligence can be as severe and as verifiable as those caused
by intentional conduct. 78  The defendant's state of mind therefore seems
irrelevant. Hence, there appears to be little, if any, justifiable distinction
While we note that resulting emotional disturbance can be as severe and as certain
whether it be caused by an intentional act or by a negligent act, we are bound by
decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court .... [W]e conclude that any recognition of
negligent infliction of mental distress as a separate tort must come from the supreme
court of this State.
See also Corey v. Hiberly, 346 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1965) (widow of fireman denied recovery,
applying Illinois law, for mental suffering from defendant who negligently started fire); Kaiser-
man v. Bright, 61111. App. 3d 67, 72, 377 N.E.2d 261, 264 (1st Dist. 1978) (family of boy struck
and killed by taxi denied recovery for emotional distress resulting from driver's negligence);
McCullough v. Orcutt, 14 I11. App. 2d 513, 522-23, 145 N.E.2d 109, 114 (2d Dist. 1957) (per
curiam) (denied recovery for miscarriage caused by shock when husband suffered injuries from
driver's negligent collision with truck at highway intersection). The Illinois Supreme Court has
recently refused to hear cases dealing with the impact doctrine; plaintiffs who have chosen to
take appeals watch as their petitions for leave to appeal are routinely denied by the high court.
75. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 I11. 2d 73, 87, 174 N.E.2d 157, 165 (1961). See note 78 infra and
notes 109-117 and accompanying text infra.
76. 63 111. App. 3d 502, 380 N.E.2d 63 (4th Dist. 1978).
77. Id. at 502-03, 380 N.E.2d at 64. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of discovering her
husband's dead body hunched over the steering wheel, she sustained "severe mental pain, fright,
shock, depression, instability, nervous tension, and experienced physical manifestations of this
emotional distress including dizziness, chest discomfort, anxiety attacks, insomnia, and frequent
awakenings." Id. at 503, 380 N.E.2d at 64.
78. Id. at 505, 380 N.E.2d at 66. Other Illinois courts have also noted that emotional injuries
can arise independent of bodily harm, and that there exists no just distinction between mental
suffering resulting from negligent and intentional conduct. In Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73,
84-85, 174 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 (1961), where the Supreme Court of Illinois first recognized an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court supported the adoption of such an
action by referring to developing medical knowledge in determining whether the claimant
actually suffered injuries flowing from fright. In addition, rather than adopting the approach
taken by the Braun court, the Knierim court assumed that mental injuries are inherently
separable from bodily harm, and therefore can be compensated for even in the absence of
physical injuries. Id.
Moreover, medical authorities have generally recognized that severe mental distress causing
physical disease frequently results from shock unaccompanied by contemporaneous physical
injury. See notes 25-36 and accompanying text supra.
Further, the fact that Illinois joins the majority of jurisdictions in recognizing an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress indicates that Illinois courts no longer regard physical
and emotional injuries to be inseparable. See Garris v. Schwartz, 551 F.2d 156, 157 (7th Cir.
1977) (erroneous advice of attorney calculated to cause mental distress is actionable); Public Fin.
Corp. v. Davis, 66 I11. 2d 85, 90, 360 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1976) (intentional conduct warranting
action for mental distress must be extreme and outrageous); Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing
Co., 55 I11. App. 3d 959, 963, 370 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (1st Dist. 1977) (physical impact doctrine
irrelevant to actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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between negligent and intentional infliction of mental distress because either
act can cause severe and lasting injury.
Perhaps in recognition of the artificiality of this distinction, recent appel-
late court interpretations of the physical impact doctrine have significantly
limited the scope of the Braun holding. Instead of equating physical impact
solely with bodily harm, as the court did in Braun, the Illinois Appellate
Court has ruled that physical impact contemplates either bodily injury or
property damage. In Benza v. Schulman Air Freight,79 the appellate court
denied recovery for mental distress resulting from a near head-on colli-
sion. 0 Rather than decide the case on the absence of bodily injury, the
Benza court denied relief because there was no impact between the vehi-
cles. 8  Similarly, in Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing Co., 2 where the
defendant tailgated the plaintiff's automobile at speeds of 70 to 80 miles per
hour for many miles,8 3 the court denied recovery for mental distress, not
because the plaintiff suffered no bodily harm, but because the cars never
touched. 4 Had there been a collision in either Benza or Rosenberg, dam-
ages for mental distress presumably would have been awarded even if the
impact caused the plaintiff no contemporaneous bodily injury. Thus, in
future appellate court decisions, adequate proof of contemporaneous prop-
erty damage might suffice to permit the plaintiff to recover for emotional
distress.
In deciding these cases, Illinois courts have generally focused on problems
of proximate causation and then summarily concluded that absent a physical
impact (or property damage), a claimant's injuries are not reasonably fore-
seeable.8" The concept of reasonable foreseeability is subverted, however,
because the courts have failed to consider the duty of care owed by defend-
ants to those persons immediately surrounding them.88 If foreseeability was
79. 46 Ill. App. 3d 521, 361 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1977).
80. Id. at 522-23, 361 N.E.2d at 92.
81. Id. at 523, 361 N.E.2d at 92. It should be pointed out, however, that the Benza court
never expressly held that the plaintiff's complaint would have survived a motion to dismiss had
there been impact between the vehicles.
Illinois courts have apparently interpreted Benza in an ambiguous manner. In Neuberg v.
Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 60 Ill. App. 3d 679, 683, 377 N.E.2d 215, 217 (1st Dist.
1978), the court cited Benza for the proposition that, to recover for mental distress, a claimant
must show that the defendant's negligent conduct "physically injured" him. In Kaiserman v.
Bright, 61 I11. App. 3d 67, 71, 377 N.E.2d 261, 264 (1st Dist. 1978), the Illinois Appellate Court
cited Benza for the proposition that a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress
must allege "physical impact or contemporaneous physical injury" to survive a motion to dismiss.
82. 55 Ill. App. 3d 959, 370 N.E.2d 1235 (1st Dist. 1977).
83. Id. at 961, 370 N.E.2d at 1237.
84. Id. at 962, 370 N.E.2d at 1238.
85. See notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text supra.
86. Some courts have permitted recovery as long as the plaintiff can show he was within the
zone of danger created by negligent conduct or was in fear for his own safety. See Chiuchiolo v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930); Flazone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559,
214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961);
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determined by the spacial relationship between the parties, instead of the
presence of physical impact, the element of proximate cause could be satis-
fied even in the absence of such bodily injury.
Notwithstanding the appellate court's reluctance to fully embrace Braun,
the Illinois Supreme Court has abandoned the impact rule "concept" in its
construction of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.8 7 In Pathfinder Co.
v. Industrial Commission,"' the claimant suffered mental distress after extri-
cating a co-worker's severed hand from a punch press.89 The Pathfinder
court reversed the lower court's refusal to allow the Commission to award
the claimant disability payments for her mental distress and held that an
employee who suffers a sudden and severe emotional shock, which produces
psychological disability and which is traceable to a definite time, place, and
readily perceivable cause, can recover under the Act even though no physical
injury was sustained. 0 In so ruling, the Pathfinder court rebutted every
argument advanced in support of the impact doctrine.
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). See also notes 40-51 and accompanying
text supra.
Other courts have held that recovery may be awarded for mental distress provided such
psychic injuries are a foreseeable consequence of negligent conduct. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758
(1974); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va.
27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). See notes 55-64 and accompanying text supra.
87. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-28 (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Illinois Workers'
Compensation Act or the Act]. To determine whether the claimant could recover under the Act
in Pathfinder, the supreme court had to find that (1) the claimant suffered an accidental injury
within the meaning of § 138.2 of the Act; (2) the injury was proven by competent evidence,
including objective symptoms not within the physical or mental control of the claimant under §
138.8(b)(7) of the Act; (3) the injury was traceable to a definite time and place under Mattheisen
& Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Bd., 284 I11. 378, 383, 120 N.E. 249, 251 (1918); (4) the injury
was in fact the cause of the disability under Boland v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d 422, 423,
216 N.E.2d 152, 153 (1966); and (5) the injury arose out of and in the course of employment
under § 138.2 of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.
However, the Act has since been amended so that the claimant need not prove the injury or
disability by showing objective symptoms which resulted from the trauma. Public Act 79-79,
June 17, 1975, deleted § 138.8 (b) (7) of the 1973 Act. According to Mr. David Anderson, the
sponsor of the Act, the Act's purpose was to increase the amount of compensation awarded for
each injury and to remove the impediment to expanded compensation that § 138(b)(7) pre-
sented. Abolishment of the Act's only evidentiary requirement has undoubtedly increased
awards for all injuries, including psychological injury. Telephone interview with David Ander-
son, attorney with the Illinois Legislative Reference Library Service, on October 5, 1976.
The supreme court has also abandoned the physical impact rule in cases of intentional
infliction of mental distress. See Knierim v. Izzo, 22 I11. 2d 73, 174, N.E.2d 157 (1961). See
generally Note, Action Maintainable for Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress
Unaccompanied by Physical Injury, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 535. See also notes 109-117 and accom-
panying text infra.
88. 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976).
89. Id. at 559, 343 N.E.2d at 915.
90. Id. at 563, 343 N.E.2d at 917. Before Pathfinder, Illinois courts had granted compensa-
tion for psychological disability only if accompanied or preceded by physical injury. See Spetyla
v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 319 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1974) (mental distress preceded by
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The Pathfinder court first discredited the logic of denying recovery for
psychological disability unaccompanied by physical injuries; courts had con-
sistently allowed generous awards to claimants who suffered psychological
disability caused by minor physical injury.9 Second, the supreme court
cited contemporary medical evidence to demonstrate that it was "medically
unjustifiable" 2 to maintain a legal gulf between the physical and emotional
claimant's head falling against a steel table warranted temporary total disability compensation);
Hook v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 IlI. 2d 245, 248, 290 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1972) (compensation for a
disability resulting from traumatic neurosis after carpenter fell from scaffold warranted); Postal
Tel. Cable Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 345 Il1. 349, 349-50, 178 N.E. 187, 187 (1931) (recovery
for traumatic neurosis permitted where claimant sustained severe blow to the face); Armour
Grain Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 323 I11. 80, 86, 153 N.E. 699, 702 (1926) (recovery permitted
for claimant's mental condition occasioned by industrial explosion).
Courts in other states are split as to whether their Workers' Compensation Acts permit
recovery for psychological injury absent physical impact. For decisions denying recovery for
negligent infliction of mental distress, see Shope v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 23, 495
P.2d 148 (1972); Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968); Jacobs v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966); Bekeleski v. C.F. Neal Co.,
141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942). For cases permitting recovery for mental distress without
accompanying physical injury, see Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 95, 486 P.2d 207
(1971); Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279
(1971); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 328, 10 N.W.2d 903 (1943); Wolfe v. Sibley,
Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975); Bailey v.
American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955); Burlington Mills Corp. v.
Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
91. 62 Ill.2d at 564, 343 N.E.2d at 917. See City of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 111. 2d
284, 319 N.E.2d 749 (1974) (claimant who suffered muscle pull compensated for resulting
disabling "phantom pain" even though medical experts could find no organic explanation for the
pain); Hook v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 I11. 2d 245, 290 N.E.2d 890 (1972) (claimant who suffered
back injury compensated for disabling traumatic neurosis which may have resulted from the
same accident); Thomas J. Douglass & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 35 111. 2d 100, 219 N.E.2d 486
(1966) (claimant who suffered toe injury compensated for traumatic neurosis which may have
resulted from the same accident); United States Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 313 Ill. 590, 145
N.E. 122 (1924) (claimant who suffered fractured vertebrae compensated for a resulting stooped
walking posture even though there was no longer any pathological reason for such a posture).
92. 62 Ill.2d at 565, 343 N.E.2d at 917-18. Professor Larson believes that any distinction
between physical and nervous injuries cannot be justified:
Against the rather old-fashioned clinging to some shred of the "physical" in these
cases must be balanced the fact that, once this shred has been found, awards issue
that require recognition of some of the most sophisticated theories of the interaction
of the mind and body and of some of the most complex neurotic conditions including
-compensation neurosis." As to the category of mental stimulus causing nervous
injury, with no "physical" involvement, although the cases are now sharply divided,
the strength of the trend toward coverage suggests that the time is perhaps not too
far off when compensation law generally will cease to set an artificial and medically
unjustifiable gulf between the "physical" and the "nervous." The test of existence of
injury can then be greatly simplified. The single question will be whether there was
a harmful change in the human organism-not just its bones and muscles, but its
brain and nerves as well.
Larson, Mental & Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1260
(1970). Accord, Render, Mental Illness As An Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L. REV. 288 (1964);
Note, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 112-q
(1961).
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realms of human behavior. Further, the Pathfinder court determined that
recognizing an action for negligent infliction of mental distress under the
Workers' Compensation Act would not spur a flood of frivolous or fraudulent
claims.9 3  The tide of claims had not washed out other jurisdictions that
permitted compensation for mental distress, 4 nor had the Illinois Industrial
Commission experienced a significant increase in the number of claims filed
subsequent to allowance of compensatory awards for psychological dam-
age.9 5  The Pathfinder court, moreover, reasoned that the Commission's
vigilance would effectively detect fabricated and exaggerated claims before
litigation commenced. 9
It is difficult to reconcile separate rules regarding recovery for mental
distress in and out of the workplace. By acknowledging that negligently
inflicted emotional injuries fall within the protection afforded by the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act, the Pathfinder court cogently dismissed the
rationales relied upon in the Braun decision. 97 Moreover, no valid distinc-
tion exists between compensation under the Act and compensation under
traditional tort theories, and it stands to reason that deserving plaintiffs
should be compensated. Finally, the distinctions claimed by the Pathfinder
Further, some psychiatrists have concluded that psychological injury is often more disabling
than physical injury:
Modern medical science supports the Pathfinder court's decision to compensate
psychological disability absent physical injury. Psychiatrists agree that psychological
injury, or "traumatic neurosis," is an injury to the psyche. In fact, the consensus of
medical opinion seems to be that traumatic neurosis is often more disabling than
physical injury. To condition compensation on the presence of physical injury would
be particularly questionable because clinical experiments have proven that any
physical injury reduces to some extent the probability that a traumatic neurosis will
develop. The court's decision to grant compensation for psychological injury regard-
less of physical injury, therefore,' is consistent with sound medical theories and
practice.
Note, Workmen's Compensation for Psychological Disability Without an Antecedent Physical
Injury, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 536, 540. See also R. COHEN, TRAUMATIc NEUROSES IN PERSONAL
INJURY CASES 81 (1970); Tanay, Psychic Trauma and the Law, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1033, 1034-35
(1969).
93. 62 Ill. 2d at 567, 343 N.E.2d at 919.
94. Id. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
95. 62 Ill. 2d at 567, 343 N.E.2d at 919.
96. Id. Pathfinder has been followed by the following Illinois courts: Watts v. Industrial
Comm'n, 77 Ill. 2d 30, 33, 394 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (1979) (psychologically induced injuries are
compensable under the Act in certain circumstances); Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361, 371, 362 N.E.2d 325, 329 (1977) (negligence of employee no bar to
recovery under Act).
Many of the reasons for recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate
tort are parallel to those forwarded by the Illinois Supreme Court in Pathfinder. See Knierim v.
Izzo, 22 I11. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961) (landmark decision establishing intentional infliction
of mental distress as a separate tort in Illinois). The Illinois Appellate Court, however, has
rejected the argument advanced in Benza v. Schulman Air Freight, 46 Ill. App. 3d 521, 361
N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1977), that Knierim implicitly recognized an action for negligent infliction
of mental distress.
97. See notes 67-71 and accompanying text supra.
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court-that the Act is remedial in nature and the costs of compensation are
entirely borne by employers-do not provide persuasive arguments against
abandoning the impact rule outside the workplace, for tort law is designed
and developed precisely to provide bona fide claimants with adequate reme-
dies. 8
Thus, logic and fairness require the Illinois Supreme Court to abandon the
physical impact rule and recognize a separate tort for negligent infliction of
mental distress. The impact rule subverts the concept of proximate cause by
failing to adequately assess the defendant's duty of care. The Illinois Appel-
late Court has not adhered to the impact rule because it considers it correct;
it has adhered to the rule merely because the Braun decision is firmly rooted
as precedent. Finally, in recognizing that the Illinois Workers' Compensa-
tion Act permits recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress,
the Illinois Supreme Court has placed itself in the impossible situation of
having to reconcile Braun with Pathfinder, an indication that perhaps the
court no longer considers the Braun physical impact rule justified or defensi-
ble.
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND BRAUN: DEVELOPING
THE LAW IN THE FACE OF A CONFLICTING PRECEDENT
Illinois' physical impact rule is obviously ready for reform, as the spate of
recent appellate decisions on this point demonstrate. The sole problem, of
course, is antiquated precedent. Although judicial precedents such as Braun
have a settling effect on the law,"" adherence to them is not always appropri-
98. In essence, the Pathfinder court distinguished the Workers' Compensation Act from
general tort theory on the following grounds: (1) The Act is remedial in nature in that it is
intended to provide financial protection to the injured worker; (2) The costs incurred by the
allowance of claims are borne by the employer; (3) The rights and remedies of the employee are
statutory rather than common law rights; (4) It has been consistently held that the Act should be
liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and objects. 62 Ill. 2d at 563, 343 N.E.2d at
916-17.
At least one commentator believes that the distinctions the Pathfinder court drew between
the Act and general tort theory are valid:
The social purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act ... cannot be disregarded
when analyzing the applicability of common law tort limitations to workmens'
compensation proceedings. The undisputed purpose of the Act is to provide financial
protection for employees injured while at work. The underlying philosophy of the
Act is that all injuries suffered at work are costs of industry and thus should be borne
by industry. Once the determination is made that a psychological injury is an
accidental injury within the meaning of the Act, an application of the tort law
requirement of concurrent physical injury would defeat the Act's social purpose.
Note, Workmen's Compensation for Psychological Disability Without an Antecedent Physical
Injury, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 536, 547 (1977).
99. Judicial concern for the rippling effect of precedent may result in occasional injustice
because of the court's fear of unsettling law for the future. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 154-55 (1930) [hereinafter cited as FRANK]. Judge Frank derides such concern and advises
the judiciary to deal with the case at hand. See note 102 infra.
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ate nor desirable. This is especially so when changing times and changing
needs dictate a break from the past and the charting of new legal courses,
which is clearly the case with negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
ideal balance between established rules and modern notions of public policy,
as former Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter V. Schaefer once observed,
would be "a blend which takes into account in due proportion the wisdom of
the past and the needs of the present."' 00
It was once the belief, and may still be today, of some members of the bar
that the law should be circumscribed and unalterable, remaining governed
by the wisdom of the past. °10 Perhaps this belief arose out of a desire to
control the future; or perhaps it was an attempt to avoid the problems of the
present.102  Commentators have long argued, however, that the common
law is, in reality, a body of legal principles to be developed by judicial
exposition on a case-by-case basis. Despite the urgings of some that precedent
be adhered to or that social change be administered by the legislature,10 3
judges do and must make law. 0 4 This is the result of a combination of the
"pragmatism of decision-making," the "demands of economic or social logic
100. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 24 (1966) [hereinafter referred to
as Schaefer). While the phrase, precedent and policy "suggests a sharp antithesis, a relationship
of mutual exclusion," Justice Schaefer contends that such is not always the case. Id. at 6-7.
101. Blackstone, apparently, viewed the common law as complete in itself to the exclusion of
statutory or judicial modification, and one English tribunal claimed in 1875 that they were
"bound to take the act of Parliament as they have made it; a casus omissus can in no way be
supplied by a court of law for that would be to make law." Id. at 18. See Landis, Statutes and
Sources oj Law, in HARVAR LEGAL ESSAYs 213, 216-17 (1934).
"Reception" statutes have been adopted by many states, their purpose being to adopt the
common law of England:
That the common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general
nature, and all statutes or acts of the British parliament made in aid of, and to
supply the defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First,
and which are of a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of
decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative author-
ity.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1, § 801 (1979). See note 124 infra for discussion of a decision which
construed the aforementioned statute.
102. FRANK, supra note 99, at 153-54. Judge Frank contends that the hope of controlling the
future is "doomed to futility" because the future brings its own problems and obstacles. An
attempt to control the future ultimately results in ignoring the present. Instead of continually
chasing the rainbow, the judge urges fellow jurists to concentrate on the case and issues at hand
without concern for future ramifications. Id. at 154. Judge Schaefer, however, argues that cases
are actually decided in the belief that future cases will be directly affected. Schaefer, supra note
100, at 3-4.
103. According to one commentator, delay by the courts in anticipation of legislative action
may ultimately hinder reform of tort law due to: (1) legislators' indifference to tort law making;
(2) lack of experience, time, and wages; (3) failure to hold effective committee and public
hearings; and (4) subjection to aggressive lobbies and pressure groups. See generally Peck, The
Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1963).
104. The belief that judges are powerless to make new law "is a direct outgrowth of a
subjective need for believing in a stable, approximately unalterable legal world-in effect, a
child's world." FRANK, supra note 99, at 35.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
or fairness," and the reflection by the law of "rules sufficiently acceptable for
society to support.' ' 10 5 According to Cardozo:
[A] rule which in its origin was a creation of the courts themselves, and
supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated
by the court when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule
would do violence to the social conscience .... [T]his is not usurpation. It
is not even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of the same power
of creation that built up the common law through its exercise by judges of
the past. 06
Without judicial development of the law to meet the needs of society, as in
the area of emotional injuries, our legal system could easily stagnate and the
role of the judiciary could greatly diminish. When a jurisdiction is faced with
an obsolete common law precedent, such as Braun, the courts need not
persist in error 0 7 simply because of the presence of law already made. By
looking to policy expressions and decisions in other jurisdictions and by
extending concepts to reach problems unanticipated by earlier authors of the
common law, judicial decision making accomodates gaps in the law to better
serve justice. Several cases illustrate the endeavors of the Illinois Supreme
Court to develop the common law in response to social demands.108
In Knierim v. Izzo, 09 the issue was whether the plaintiff could maintain
an action against the murderer of her husband for intentional infliction of
mental anguish that did not result from physical injury. The supreme court
embraced intentional infliction of severe emotional distress as a separate tort
and allowed recovery for emotional distress as well as any bodily harm
resulting therefrom."10 In modifying the common law rule against recovery
for mental suffering, the court considered a series of rational propositions
and modern developments in the law: (1) the recognition of compensatory
damages for pain and suffering;"' (2) the advances of psychosomatic medi-
105. Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 563, 567 (1976).
106. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 136-37 (1924).
107. While seemingly unjust decisions may appear, in this day and age, to have been made in
error, the truth may be simply that they are obsolete. Schaefer, supra note 100, at 10-11.
108. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (damages recover-
able by terminable-at-will employee retaliatorily discharged); Darling v. Charleston Commu-
nity Memorial Hosp., 33 I11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965) (hospital held liable in tort for
negligence beyond its liability insurance coverage); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.
No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (school district held liable in tort for employee's
negligence).
109. 22 I11. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
110. According to the court, "peace of mind is an interest of sufficient importance to receive
protection from the law against intentional invasion .... Id. at 87, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
111. According to the Knierimn court, it would be no more difficult to assess pecuniary
damages for mental disturbance caused by negligence than for mental disturbance caused by
defamation, malicious prosecution, or assault. 22 11. 2d at 84, 174 N.E.2d at 163 (citations
omitted).
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cine in the nature of men's emotions and their bodily effects;" 2 (3) the
fairness in providing a forum for redress of mental disturbances;" 3 and (4)
the ability of judge and juror to determine whether outrageous conduct
could result in severe emotional distress. " 4 Having established a foundation
for change," 5 the court relied on the resources of the judiciary to ferret out
frivolous claims and support the new judicially created law. The court thus
drew back from pre-determined conclusions dictated by the historic fear of
the extension of liability, and recognized the necessity to decide each case on
its own merits." 6  The court gave credence to the theory that an "intense
intellectual and emotional life . . . has come with the advance of civiliza-
tion, [making] it clear that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life
lie in physical things."'" 7  Recognizing the ability of the judicial process to
prevent litigation from entering the field of mere trivialities, the Illinois
Supreme Court found comfort in the importance of peace of mind being
protected by the law against intentional invasion.
112. The court noted that advances in medicine in the thirty year period preceeding the
decision cast genuine doubt on the validity of the argument that mental and emotional injuries
were too "evanescent, intangible, and peculiar" for the law to remedy. 22 I11. 2d at 84-85, 174
N.E.2d at 163-64.
113. The court reasoned that tribunals should be able to draw a line between serious injuries
and trivial injuries and, thus, weed out fictitious claims. Id. at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 104.
114. The court repudiated the subjective methods used to determine whether words or
conduct were actionable in character and acquiesced with the decision of the Supreme Court of
Florida in Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 100 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1958), that the standard
of conduct to be applied was to be an objective standard formulated from common acceptation.
Such unwarranted intrusion had to be calculated to cause severe emotional distress to a person of
ordinary sensibilities. 22 Ill. 2d at 86, 174 N.E.2d at 164. Once again, the court displayed
confidence in "the men of science" in conjunction with the personal experiences of jurors to
determine whether a petitioner had suffered severe emotional distress and was entitled to
recovery. Id. at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 184.
115. The Knierim court built its foundation for change by discarding the same reasons that
were used to support the impact rule in cases of negligent infliction of mental distress. In fact,
the court specifically cited Braun v. Craven as an example of two such obsolete reasons: the
belief that mental injuries could not be dealt with by the legal system, and the fear that
recognition of a cause of action would open the door to fictitious claims. 22 I11. 2d at 84-86, 174
N.E.2d at 164.
However, Judge House and his colleagues did not take the opportunity to extend their logical
analysis to negligence actions. The court in Knierim quoted with approval a Florida decision
which allowed recovery for the intentional infliction of mental distress, emphasizing that "[t]he
unwarranted intrusion must be calculated to cause 'severe emotional distress.' " Slocum v. Food
Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So.2d 396, 398 (Fla. 1958) (emphasis added), quoted at 22 Ill.
2d 86, 174 N.E.2d 164.
116. According to the court, not "every emotional upset should constitute the basis of an
action .... [A] line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex
society and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in
social utility." 22 Ill. 2d at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 164.
117. Id. at 87, 174 N.E.2d at 165. The theory was originally advanced in Brandeis & Warren,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). The authors purport that the protection of
society can only be accomplished via the protection of the rights of the individual. Id. at 219-20.
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Similarly, in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,"" the Illinois Supreme
Court considered whether a child, not conceived at the time negligent acts
were committed against its mother, had a cause of action against the tort-
feasors for injuries caused by their conduct."19 In a careful and well-rea-
soned opinion, the court examined the development of medical science' 20
before considering the duty owed to a plaintiff not yet conceived. The court
relied on the concept of duty as a means by which to direct the course of the
common law and granted relief for an act committed prior to conception. In
so deciding, the court recognized a right to be born free from prenatal
injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother. '21 In
articulating the extension of duty, the majority's decision was consonant with
current perceptions of justice and reaffirmed the court's responsibility for
fitting law to necessity by altering the restrictions of precedent. Justice
Dooley, in his concurring opinion, quoted Corbin as to the proper response
of the court when faced with out-dated decisional law:
It is the function of our courts to keep the doctrines up to date with the
mores by continual restatement and by giving them a continually new
content. This is judicial legislation, and the judge legislates at his peril.
Nevertheless, it is the necessity and duty of such legislation that gives the
judicial office its highest honor; and no brave and honest judge shirks the
duty or fears the peril. 2
Justice Dooley found it essential that courts create law, for if they did not,
the common law would remain out of touch with life. In discussing the
concept, he stated that "the body of law is not a repository of stagnant
problems of society but a vital, moving force which [must] deal with the
current problems of society.' 23 His concurrence indicated that the common
law should be regarded as a system of elementary rules and general declara-
118. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
119. 67 Ill. 2d at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251. The plaintiff alleged that when her mother was
thirteen, the defendant negligently transfused her with RH positive blood. The mother's RH
negative blood was incompatible with and sensitized by the RH positive blood. The resulting
sensitization of the mother's blood subsequently caused prenatal damage to the plaintiff's hemo-
lithic processes and induced her premature birth. 67 Ill. 2d at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
120. 67 I11. 2d at 350-52, 367 N.E.2d at 1251-52. The court reviewed the cases in Illinois and
other jurisdictions which first recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries. These cases
represented a reversal of the common law tradition against recovery for prenatal injuries as
exemplified by Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884),
and Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). According to the dissent in
Allaire, the majority's opinion sacrificed "truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to say an injury
was not to the child but wholly to the mother." 184 I11. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting).
121. 67 111. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
122. Id. at 360-61, 367 N.E.2d at 1256 (quoting Comment, The Offer of an Act for a
Promise, 29 YALE L.J. 767, 771 (1920)).
123. 67 Ill. 2d at 362, 367 N.E.2d at 1257.
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tions of principles continually expanding with the progress of society' and
adapting to the gradual changes of modern life. 24
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized the harsh effect that could result
from an inflexible application of the judicially created bar to contribution
among joint tortfeasors in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Ma-
chinery Co.' 25  Faced with the necessity of performing interpretative and
administrative functions, the court considered a report submitted at the 1976
Illinois Judicial Conference by the Study Committee on Indemnity, Third
Party Actions, and Equitable Contributions. 2  The report contained a
comprehensive review of the historic development of the law and its applica-
tion to various types of litigation, and concluded that the rule in Illinois
prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors was "harsh and inequitable
in operation."'' 27 The court adopted the study committee's viewpoint and
held that when the judiciary created a rule or doctrine which, under present
conditions, is considered unsound or unjust, it not only has the power but the
duty to modify or abolish the rule. 2
Even more recently, in Alvis v. Ribar, 2 the supreme court took a further
step and abandoned the concept of contributory negligence, replacing it with
comparative negligence. Most significantly, the Alvis court addressed at
length the role of stare decisis in the court's decision-making process:
124. Id. See Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 82, 117 N.E.2d 74, 79-80 (1954) (justice
requires more than adherence to precedent in order to progress in accordance with a changing
world); Amann v. Faidy, 415 I11. 422, 433, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (1953) (value of jurisprudence
lies in its adaptability and capacity for growth); Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 Ill. 496, 502, 36
N.E. 983, 984 (1894) (common law rules continually expand with progress of society and adapt
themselves to changes in society).
In 1841, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a state statute, supra note 101, which looked to
the common law prior to the fourth year of King James I's reign as authority for future decisions.
In holding that the common law was to be read in conjunction with modifications by state law,
the court warned:
[I]f we are to be restricted to the common law, as it was enacted at fourth James,
rejecting all modifications and improvements which have since been made, by
practice and statutes ... we will find that system entirely inapplicable to our
present condition, for the simple reason that it 'is more than two hundred years
behind the age.
Penny v. Little, 3 Ill. 301, 304 (1841).
125. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977).
126. Id. at 6-7, 374 N.E.2d at 439.
127. Id. at 6, 374 N.E.2d at 439. According to the study committee, the rule against
contribution among joint tortfeasors "has resulted in a great deal of judicial effort in expanding
the concept of indemnity creatively in order to avoid the harsh results inherent in the rule." The
committee unanimously recommended the adoption of the principle of contribution, and sug-
gested that liability "be apportioned on the basis of [the tortfeasors'] pure relative fault." Id. at
6-7, 374 N.E.2d at 439.
128. 70 111. 2d at 13-14, 374 N.E.2d at 442. The court, thus, modified a rule of law that had
been accepted by Illinois courts for 122 years. See Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443, 449 (1856)
(principle laid down by English court in 1799 still "unquestionable law").
129. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
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The tenets of stare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in
its duty to develop the law. Clearly, the need for stability in law must not
be allowed to obscure the changing needs of society or to veil the injustice
resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation. This court can no longer
ignore the fact that Illinois is currently out of step with the majority of
States and with the common law countries of the world. We cannot
continue to ignore the plight of plaintiffs, who because of some negligence
on their part, are forced to bear the entire burden of their injuries. Neither
can we condone the policy of allowing defendants to totally escape liabil-
ity for injuries arising from their own negligence on the pretext that
another party's negligence has contributed to such injuries. 130
The cogent analysis in Alvis is equally applicable to negligent infliction of
emotional distress plaintiffs who needlessly suffer through no fault of their
own simply because Illinois remains out of step with modern common law
decisions that allow recovery under more flexible and more realistic theories.
It appears, from a review of the aforementioned cases, that the Illinois
Supreme Court is cognizant of its obligation to keep the common law equal
to life's problems. Plaintiffs in Illinois, however, are still bound by the
antiquated Braun rule against recovery for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. 131 Even when plaintiffs allege compelling facts and changing
social policy, the appellate courts, often reluctantly, have persisted in their
adherence to the 1898 decision. 132 This conduct by the courts is seemingly
incompatible with their belief in advancing the logical development of the
law to reach formerly unanticipated problems. 133
The doctrine of stare decisis does not require courts to perpetuate outworn
rules. While adherence to precedent is important to the law's stability,'34 it is
130. Id. at 24-25, 421 N.E.2d at 896 (citations omitted).
131. See Braun v. Craven, 175 I11. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
132. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
133. In 1959, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth that:
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring [Illinois courts] to
blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears
that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our
duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant
with our present day concepts of right and justice.
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959).
The plaintiff in Molitor was injured when the school bus in which he was riding left the road due
to the driver's negligence, hit a culvert, exploded and burned. Id. at 12-13, 163 N.E.2d at 89.
Prior to the Molitor decision, school districts in Illinois had been immune from liability for
tortious conduct by their employees since 1898. Kinnaire v. City of Chicago, 171 I11. 332, 44
N.E. 535 (1898). The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, employed its "inherent power as the
highest court of [the] state" to modify the common law rule. 18 Ill. 2d at 28, 163 N.E. 2d at 97.
See also Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 615, 131 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1956) (stare decisis is an
important factor, but it is not controlling in all cases); Bradley v. Fox, 7 I11. 2d 106, 111, 129
N.E.2d 699, 702 (1955) (court has power and duty to reexamine legal authorities and concepts
under doctrine of stare decisis).
134. According to Judge Schaefer, precedents are the "starting point of decision," but not
always the "concluding point." Schaefer, supra note 100, at 5.
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the court's duty to reexamine past decisions when legitimate doubts are
raised as to the validity of such decisions. 13 5 A persuasive argument may
thus be made that when judges of an earlier generation establish a doctrine
believed to be a sound instrument of judicial policy that furthers the moral,
social, and economic welfare of the state's people, judges of a later genera-
tion must be ready to discharge their own judicial responsibilities in con-
formance with modern day concepts and needs.13 6  When compelling rea-
sons exist for judicial application of a new rule, the doctrine of stare decisis
must be limited. It is not urged that hundreds of years of jurisprudence be
discarded or that courts begin anew when faced with modern litigation.
Rather, as Justice Schaefer envisioned, the "wisdom of the past" and the
"needs of the present" should co-exist and contribute "in due proportion" to
decision making.13 7 Recognition of the necessity to modify or abolish unwise
law in response to public policy and social needs in appropriate cases such as
Braun best serves society and our legal system as well.
CONCLUSION
In negligently inflicted emotional distress cases, Illinois still adheres to an
obsolete rule modified or abrogated by the vast majority of states. Even
though Illinois' common law physical impact doctrine has no logical support
and, in fact, has been rejected by the supreme court in the area of workers'
compensation, Illinois plaintiffs continue to suffer needless financial depriva-
tion in addition to their negligently inflicted emotional injuries. This gross
injustice can and must be ended by overruling the long-standing Braun
decision.
The power to abandon Braun, however, lies primarily with the Illinois
Supreme Court and, thus far, the court has been unwilling to act. Perhaps
the court is waiting for the right case to come along, although any of the
recent appellate court decisions would surely have sufficed. If and when the
court chooses to address this pressing problem, it is hoped that the court will
be cognizant of its well-established duty to conform legal principles to mod-
ern needs, as it has done in other areas. Until then, Illinois courts will follow
19th century law even though Illinois citizens suffer from 20th century
injuries.
135. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I11. 2d 608, 615, 131 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1956). In Nudd, the court
held that where a minor was injured in an automobile driven by his father, he could recover via
suit against his father notwithstanding the traditional public policy of parental immunity. 7 I11.
2d at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531. Foley v. Foley, 61111. App. 577 (2d Dist. 1895), a decision which
stood for 60 years, was thus overruled. The Nudd court rejected the notion that a modification of
the immunity doctrine must be undertaken only by the legislature. "The doctrine of parental
immunity . . . was created by the courts. It is especially for them to interpret and modify that
doctrine to correspond with prevalent considerations of public policy and social needs." 7 Ill. 2d
at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
136. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 13 Ill. 2d at 26, 163 N.E.2d at 96
(1959).
137. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
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